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Thoughts on the Scientific Study of Phenomenal Consciousness
Stan B. Klein
University of California, Santa Barbara
This article is about the hard problem of phenomenal consciousness (i.e., how is
subjective experience possible given the scientific presumption that everything from
molecules to minerals to minds is wholly physical?). I first argue that one of the most
valuable tools in the scientific arsenal (metaphor) cannot be recruited to address the
hard problem due to the inability to forge connections between the stubborn fact of
subjective experience and physically grounded models of scientific explanation. I then
argue that adherence to the physicalist tenets of contemporary science has a limiting
effect on a full appreciation of the phenomenon under discussion.
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Consciousness is a subject whose explication
(much less existence) has captured the attention
of dedicated and able thinkers for thousands of
years. Despite the optimistic claims of a few
(see below), perennial struggles with this topic
show little evidence of imminent resolution.
According to contemporary thought, con-
sciousness comes in a variety of kinds (e.g.,
sentience, access consciousness, noetic con-
sciousness, autonoetic consciousness, temporal
consciousness, core consciousness, reflective
consciousness, primary consciousness, phe-
nomenal consciousness; e.g., Klein, 2014a). My
use of the term consists in the proposition that X
is conscious if and only if there is “something it
is like” for subject “X to be in mental state Y”
(e.g., Nagel, 1974). As Hacker (2002) observed,
“the subjective or qualitative feel of a con-
sciousness experience . . . is characterized in
terms of there being something it is like for an
organism to have the experience” (p 160; em-
phasis in original). That is, consciousness, as I
use the term, consists in first-person subjectiv-
ity. This usage is what most philosophers have
in mind when discussing phenomenal con-
sciousness (e.g., Chalmers, 1996; Klein, 2014a;
Strawson, 2009), although a precise definition
of “what it is like to be in a particular state” has
proven to be notoriously difficult (e.g., Block,
1995).1
The explanatory challenge of phenomenal
consciousness is called the hard problem: How
does subjective experience (i.e., qualia) arise
from physical2 objects and their relations (e.g.,
Banick, 2019; Chalmers, 1996; Clement & Mal-
erstein, 2003; Georgalis, 2006; Jackson, 1982).
Put differently, how is experiential reality (the
aspect of reality of which we can be most cer-
tain; e.g., Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008; Midgley,
2014; Strawson, 2009; Wittgenstein, 1958) pos-
sible, given that the dictates of contemporary
science stipulate that everything from mole-
cules to minerals to minds is wholly physical
(for reviews, see Crane & Mellor, 1990; Klein,
2016; Strawson, 2009).
Some argue that the hard problem is, and will
remain, intractable in consequence of its incom-
mensurability with the requirements of scientific
method and explanation (e.g., Levine, 2003;
Wright, 2007). Others attribute its recalcitrance to
1 To avoid expositional repetition, I use several terms to
refer to phenomenal consciousness—for example, subjectivity,
qualia and experiential reality. Although these designations
are not exact synonyms, their family resemblances are suffi-
ciently close to allow one to stand proxy for another.
2 The terms material and physical both are used to refer to
the doctrine that everything that exists, exists wholly as matter.
Although they are not strictly synonymous (for a discussion,
see Klein, 2016), in what follows, I will not distinguish be-
tween them when discussing the metaphysical doctrine that
nature is limited to facts about matter and its interactions.
Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-
dressed to X Stan B. Klein, Department of Psychological
and Brain Sciences, University of California, Santa Barbara,
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conceptual limitations of the human mind (e.g.,
McGinn, 1991; Plonitsky, 2010). Still others deny
the hard problem exists, arguing either (a) a sci-
entific solution already is at hand (e.g., Graziano,
2019; Tsuchiya, 2017) or (b) the problem is chi-
meric—a quixotic attempt to imbue substance to
an ill-formed question (e.g., Carruthers, 2000;
Dennett, 1991; Jackson, 2003).
Perhaps the most common stance among psy-
chologists and neuroscientists is to allow that qua-
lia constitute an aspect of reality, but do so solely
as epiphenomena (e.g., Crane & Mellor, 1990;
Jackson, 1982; Oakley & Halligan, 2017; for a
recent review, see W. Robinson, 2019). This ex-
istential devaluation is dictated by a robust, though
often unreflective, allegiance to the metaphysical
dogma of physicalism (for discussions see Klein,
2014a, 2016; D. N. Robinson, 2008). Because
nonphysical aspects of reality are stipulated to be
incapable of partaking in causal relations with the
physical world (i.e., the principle of causal closure
under the physical; e.g., Collins, 2008), conscious-
ness, by definitional fiat, is stripped of any capac-
ity to participate in physical reality. This, of
course, is the modern version of Descartes’s di-
lemma (e.g., Almog, 2002).
Saving the Phenomenon
Epistemic recalcitrance, however, does not
sanction consigning “the feeling of what it is
like” to ontological oblivion. Although no
means currently are available for capturing phe-
nomenal consciousness in scientific or philo-
sophical discourse (e.g., Klein, 2012; McGinn,
2004; Plonitsky, 2010), subjective experience is
“as real as rabbits and rocks” (Strawson, 2009;
p. 103). Indeed, its reality is the thing of which
we can be most certain (e.g., Gallagher & Za-
havi, 2008; Georgalis, 2006; Klein, 2014a;
Shoemaker, 1968; Strawson, 2009; Varela,
Thompson, & Rosch, 1993). To ignore experi-
ential reality in consequence of scientific-
philosophic intractability is to ignore what ar-
guably is the most salient aspect of being.
The psychological topography of our mental
constructs ultimately is based on personal ac-
quaintance (cf. Russell, 1912/1999) with the
experiential acts in which they are realized (e.g.,
Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008; Klein, 2012, 2014a;
McGinn, 2004). There simply is no other way to
reliably know what a mental state, qua mental
state, entails (e.g., Klein, 2015; D. N. Robinson,
2008; Varela et al., 1993). While phenomenal
experience eventually may prove grounded in
events taking place at the neural, molecular,
atomic, or subatomic level, reducing our phe-
nomenology to the motion, shape, and size of its
physical constituents (or knowledge thereof)
cannot provide the knowledge we acquire in
virtue of having the experience (e.g., Jackson,
1986; Klein, 2014a; Strawson, 2009). As Varela
et al. (1993) noted, “When it is cognition or
mind that is being examined, the dismissal of
experience (i.e., consciousness) becomes unten-
able, even paradoxical.” They continued, “To
deny the truth of our own experience in the
scientific study of ourselves is not only unsat-
isfactory; it is to render the scientific study of
ourselves without a subject matter” (pp. 13–14;
parenthetical added for clarification).
In short, with mental states, subjective experi-
ence comes first. What remains in doubt is the
explanation, not the phenomenon. In the next sec-
tion, I suggest one reason for this epistemological
impasse.
The Problem of Metaphor and Phenomenal
Consciousness: “What Is It Like?”
It is a natural impulse, when confronted with a phenom-
enon that we do not understand, to try to relate it to things
that we do understand or at least are more familiar with.
(Roediger, 1980, p. 231)
Metaphors are indispensable to scientific and
philosophical practice (e.g., Arbib & Hess, 1986;
Bhushan & Rosenfeld, 1995; Hallyn, 2000;
Konopka, 2002; Ortony, 1993; Stahl, 1987; Tay-
lor & Dewsbury, 2018). They provide a way of
understanding the character of epistemologically
elusive phenomena by likening them to expres-
sions that relate to other, better understood phe-
nomena (e.g., Black, 1962; Boyd, 1993; Gutten-
plan, 2005; Kuhn, 1993).
To take a well-known example, in the early
days of atomic research uncertain relations be-
tween components of atomic structure were lik-
ened to better understood relations between the
heavenly bodies comprising our solar system (the
so-called Bohr model of the atom—according to
which electrons were likened to planets orbiting a
solar nucleus). Not only did this mapping help
explain the wavelengths of spectral lines obtained
from chemical elements, it also provided justifi-
cation for the physical constants describing ener-






































































































Bohr, 1913, 1934; Margenau, 1950). In Jaynes’s
(1976) terminology, the solar system metaphier
(that which is understood) helped explicate the
metaphrand (that which currently lacks a satisfac-
tory explanation).3
Even when a phenomenon is not accessible to
direct observation, a metaphor can provide a
context in which the mechanisms of the “hidden
phenomenon” can be illuminated. As one exam-
ple, for more than half a century psychologists
and philosophers have enlisted Turing’s (1936)
idealized computing device as the metaphier for
the hidden workings of the neural machine (for
a review, see Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996).
In short, metaphors shed light on novel, puz-
zling or unobservable phenomena by forging
connections between seemingly recalcitrant
facts and scientifically sanctioned models. In
consequence, they are widely considered an in-
dispensable scientific tool (e.g., Black, 1962;
Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Ortony, 1993).
However, as valuable as metaphorical prac-
tice has been to scientific theory construction,
its relevance to phenomenal consciousness can
be called into question. Specifically, phenome-
nal consciousness appears to have a categorical
irreducibility that makes it impossible to relate
to or explain in terms of other categories of
nature (e.g., Chalmers, 1996; Kant, 1998).
Consider, as one example, the subjective ex-
perience of pain. “Painfulness is not a contin-
gent property of pain, painfulness is the essence
of pain; there is no appearance beyond the pain
itself; I feel pain, the sensation of the pain is all
I feel” (Antonietti, 2008, p. 52). It is nonsense to
say that the experience of pain can be likened to
something other than itself. Although we under-
stand how the workings of, say, the brain might
be understood in terms of the properties of a
computational machine, we cannot understand
how the experience of pain or any other mental
state can be conceived in terms of anything
other than the state itself (e.g., Gallagher &
Zahavi, 2008; Jackson, 1986; Klein, 2014a;
Strawson, 2009). If this is the case, then, contra
Nagel, there is nothing it is like for subject X to
experience mental state Y, other than Y itself.
Nagel (1974), however, was adamant that his
claim that the term like in the proposal that
“there is something it is like for subject X to
have experience Y” does not imply Y can be
likened, compared or reduced to something
other than itself: “. . . the analogical form of the
English expression ‘what it is like’ is mislead-
ing. It does not mean ‘what (in our experience)
it resembles,’ but rather ‘how it is for the sub-
ject himself’” (p. 440). For Nagel, “the feeling
of what it is like for subject X to experience Y”
consisted of an irreducible first-person thought
about mental state Y qua mental state Y (in
Lewis’s, 1979, terminology, these are referred
to as de se thoughts or indexicals; see also
Castañeda, 1966; Nagel, 1986; Perry, 1979).
One way of construing Nagel’s dictum is that
he intended to set boundaries on the scope of
discourse about de se thought.4 However, as Na-
gel clearly regarded considerations of resem-
blance and comparison inappropriate for treatment
of de se thought, his proposition also is consistent
with the position that attempts to liken phenome-
nal consciousness to properties of better-under-
stood phenomena are epistemologically meaning-
less. The only thing phenomenological conscious
is “like” is “what it is like for the subject him-
self.”5
3 The solar system metaphier ultimately proved unsatis-
factory, generating numerous paradoxes and inconsistencies
(e.g., Lakhtakia, 1996).
4 Because Nagel has never been entirely clear what “an
irreducible first-person thought about mental state Y qua men-
tal state Y” implies (e.g., Block, 1995), analysis of his thesis,
even in his carefully circumscribed domain, has generated
considerable debate and analysis (e.g., Banick, 2019; Block,
1995: Clement & Malerstein, 2003; Hacker, 2002; Georgalis,
2006; Stone, 2001; Tsuchiya, 2017; Wider, 1990).
5 Some of my reviewers argue that metaphors for pain
readily are available: For example, widely used pain scales
request the patient rate pain sensation in terms of its degree
of stabbing, dullness, burning, etc. But likening pain to a
feeling of stabbing or burning (which is to engage in simile,
not scientific use of metaphor) is substituting one unknown
(the feel of pain) for another unknown (e.g., the feel of
stabbing). That is, both metaphrand and metaphier are irre-
ducibly subjective, thus rendering the use of metaphor (ac-
tually simile) an exercise in logical circularity. While one
can liken a particular experiential state Y (e.g., the experi-
ence of the color blue) to another, non-Y mental state Z
(e.g., the experience of the color blue is like [the experience
of] a cloudless, midday sky; the experience of the color blue
is like the feeling of cool tranquility), the metaphrand and
metaphier both remain firmly embedded within the same
“to-be-explained” ontological domain—subjective phenom-
ena. In short, metaphorical treatment of experiential reality
(e.g., phenomenal consciousness) is tautological. By con-
trast, the use of metaphor in the scientific exploration of
physical reality does not fall victim to this logical cul-de-sac
(compare: “The brain is like a computer.” Here, the meta-
phrand and metaphier occupy clearly distinct ontological
categories—organic and inorganic—one of which is better






































































































In short, Nagel’s “like” can be read both as an
appeal to limit the scope of scholarly discourse
as well as a de facto restriction on metaphoric
applicability. The implication of the latter read-
ing is particularly troubling for the scientific
study of phenomenal consciousness. If one as-
pires to fit subjectivity into a scientifically
proper epistemological framework, the proposi-
tion that de se indexicality cannot reach beyond
“what it is like for the subject himself” ensures
that the question “what is it like for subject X to
experience Y?” cannot, in principle, be ad-
dressed metaphorically. Accordingly, one of
science’s most valuable tools cannot be enlisted
to address the hard problem of consciousness.
Science and Consciousness
While a scientific answer to the hard problem
is difficult to envision, the existential status of
the phenomenon is not in doubt. As Wittgen-
stein (1958) famously remarked, asking some-
one “are you sure it’s you who have pains?” (p.
67) is patent nonsense. It is nonsense because
although our interpretation of the content of our
experience may be inaccurate (e.g., two parallel
lines appear to converge in the distance), we
cannot be mistaken about having the experience
(e.g., Shoemaker, 1968).
I do not reject science, per se, as an approach
to consciousness. What I take issue with is the
assumption (often implicit) that current scien-
tific method and dogma have exhausted our
ways of apprehending and knowing reality
(Tulving, personal communication, May 4,
2011). “Render to science what belongs to sci-
ence, but we should not surrender all of reality
too hastily lest we fail to encounter vast mys-
teries not accommodated by its particular set of
assumptions and methodologies” (Klein, 2014a,
p. 118).
Contemporary science simultaneously is in-
clusive and restrictive. It is inclusive in its belief
that everything falls within its theoretical juris-
diction, but it restricts what it allows to qualify
as “everything” (e.g., Martin, 2008; Papa-
Grimadli, 1998). Put another way, modern sci-
ence trades heavily on the assumptions that (a)
those aspects of reality, as we currently under-
stand them, are exhaustive of the whole (e.g.,
Jeans, 1943, 1981; Margenau, 1950; Planck,
1925/1993), and (b) the laws and constants of
physics are universal in their domain of appli-
cation (e.g., Bohr, 1934; Papa-Grimadli, 1998;
Poincare, 1952; Trusted, 1991).
However, although scientists assume that
their laws and constants remain unchanged at all
times and in all places (e.g., Poincare, 1952;
Spencer Brown, 1957; Uttal, 2008), contact
with reality is, in fact, limited to what we can
observe locally (e.g., Earle, 1955; Shallis, 1983;
Uttal, 2008). “To extend that knowledge re-
quires both an act of faith in the uniformity of
nature and a compromise with truth, for knowl-
edge has an inbuilt uncertainty to it (e.g.,
Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminacy)”
(Shallis, 1983, p. 32; comment in parenthesis
mine).
In short, to maintain that materialism, physi-
calism, idealism or any monistic metaphysic
exhausts the nature of reality is to substitute
doctrine for demonstrable fact. Such a stance
forecloses what we allow to stand as reality by
presuming that we have license to assert that
reality, in its fullness, can be captured by our
current concepts, methods and instruments of
measurement (e.g., Eddington, 1958; Elvee,
1992; Feyerabend, 1979; Horst, 2007; Jeans,
1943; Marganau, 1984; Papa-Grimadli, 1998;
Tallis, 2008; Trusted, 1999; Vaihinger, 1925;
Van Inwagen, 2002).
To declare that consciousness cannot exist
(except in a materialist incarnation) is a meta-
physical conceit lying outside what can be op-
erationally justified (e.g., Earle, 1955; Klein,
2012, 2014a, b; Martin, 2008). As Ricard and
Thuan (2001) observed,
If we define the terrain field of science as what can be
physically studied, measured, and calculated, then
right from the start we leave out everything that is
experienced in the first person (e.g., subjectivity) . . . If
we forget this limitation, then we soon start affirming
that the universe is everything that can be objectified in
the third person. . . . (p. 241; parenthesis added for
clarification)
Quite possibly we need a new, more inclu-
sive, metaphysics—one in which reality is not
reduced only to what can be manipulated by
current scientific methods (e.g., Gendlin, 1962;
Klein, 2012, 2014a, 2014b; Martin, 2008). At
present we have no way of surveying the whole
of reality (e.g., Earle, 1955, 1972). Accordingly,
to maintain that all of reality can be captured by
a single set of methods (e.g., scientific) is to
claim that reality consists in its entirety of ob-






































































































unreasonable (see also Earle, 1955, 1972; Fey-
erabend, 1979; Fodor, 1974; Kitchener, 1988;
Meixner, 2008; Martin, 2008; Nagel, 2012; Pa-
pa-Grimadli, 1998; Varela, Thompson, & Ro-
sch, 1993).
To posit that consciousness is capable of be-
ing grasped by such circumscribed aspects of
reality as matter, energy, or, more abstractly,
mathematical formalisms and universal laws is
a very restrictive enterprise—one that presup-
poses we have warrant to declare (without con-
crete evidence) that reality, in its fullness (i.e.,
experiential as well as physical), can be cap-
tured by such constructs (e.g., Feyerabend,
1979; Jackson, 1986; James, 1909/1996; Mar-
ganau, 1984; Papa-Grimadli, 1998; Varela et
al., 1993; van Fraasen, 2005). As the scope of
metaphysical possibility gradually broadens—
and I believe that, of practical necessity (cf.
Kuhn, 1962), it eventually will—the fullness of
reality will unfold in ways unimaginable from
within the shackles of a purely materialist meta-
physics.
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